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ABSTRACT 
This paper investigates the factors that affect a firm’s capital structure decision and how the 
capital structure affects a firm’s shareholder value. The two most important theories that are used 
in the thesis are the trade-off and the pecking theory. By using a dataset consisting of 502 large 
US firms during the years 2005-2014 we find that 1) The factors that affect a firm’s capital 
structure are profitability, firm size and firm risk 2) A firm’s leverage has a positive effect on 
shareholder value. In general, we find that the pecking order theory rather than the trade-off 
theory can be used to explain the capital structure of a firm. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
To lay the foundation for a company’s opportunities to exist and conduct any business at all, 
financial funds need to be provided. The intention of this paper is to investigate factors that 
affect capital structure decision. The two most well known theories regarding the latter, the 
trade-off theory and the pecking order theory, will be tested. Much of the inspiration of this 
paper comes from Eugene Fama and Kenneth French (2002), whom in their paper “Testing 
Tradeoff and Pecking Order Predictions About Dividends and Debt” test the predictions made 
from both these theories, which in some cases go against each other. We will compare our results 
with theirs as well as to other related results concerning our study.  
 
With the above-mentioned theories regarding capital structure in mind, we use a fixed effects 
model in a dataset of 502 of the biggest US firms in the period 2005-2014 asking two distinct 
questions: 
 
- What affects a firm’s decision regarding its leverage ratio?   
 
- What is the effect of leverage on shareholder value? 
 
The trade-off theory predicts among other things, that as profit increases so does the leverage of 
the firm. The steadier the cash flow, the lower the risk of bankruptcy, which leads to lower debt. 
Fama and French (2002), in their model, use return on assets to measure profitability. When 
testing for effects of cash flow, they use firm size, stating that this variable is as much a proxy 
for age as well as for the cost of accessing outside capital. Since return on assets is predicted by 
the pecking order theory to have a negative relationship with leverage, the effect of return on 
assets is a dividing point between the two theories. 
 
On the effect of certain variables, both theories predict the same result. For example regarding 
investment, as investment increase - so does debt. Fama and French (2002) confirm this, but are 
not able to explain what drives the effect. The empirical evidence from Fama and French (2002) 
gives the pecking order right, the higher profit in a firm the lower debt financing. Further, the 
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paper also reports proof for a weakness in the framework of the pecking order theory, which 
concerns the large equity issues in low-leverage firms - per se a contradiction and a big dent to 
the pecking order. The idea is that smaller firms use less equity since they are assumed to have a 
higher degree of asymmetric information.  
 
Taking one step further than Fama’s and French’s findings we will investigate the effect of 
leverage on the value of the equity of the firm. To this we want to include the diminishing effects 
of debt - predicted by the trade off theory’s statement of an optimal level of debt. This implies 
that if debt would be too high, it would have a negative effect on the equity value of the firm. 
The yearly cash flow risk, measured by its standard deviation, in a firm is included in our models 
as an independent variable, something Fama and French (2002) mentions in a short comment in 
their paper and choose to include in their variable firm size. We also choose to work with the 
ratio of the total debt and total outstanding equity rather than testing both the debt-to-book-value 
of assets and debt-to-market-value of the firm. 
 
The paper is divided into the following sections. Section 2 gives the theoretical framework we 
use, going deeper into the trade-off and the pecking order theory as well as overview some 
theories connected with these. Section 3 goes in to methodology and which model we choose to 
answer our questions. In section 4 we present the data we are using. Section 5 is about our 
expectations about and the results of the models and in section 6 we sum up our effort with 
making conclusions and present answers to our questions. 
2. THEORY  
 
Modigliani and Miller (1958) concluded that a firm’s market value, in equilibrium, is 
independent of its capital structure1. The trade-off theory (Kraus and Litzenberger, 1973), to 
some degree an extension of the M&M’s revised propositions, weighs the cost of debt as well as 
the benefits of the same. The cost of debt is referring to the cost occurring from financial distress 
of having too high debt and the deadweight cost of bankruptcy. Expansions of the trade-off 
                                                
1 Modigliani. Miller. (1958). “The Cost of Capital, Corporation Finance and the Theory of Investment”. The 
American Economic Review. Vol. 48. No. 3. p 296. 
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theory have been made over the years, Grossman and Hart (1982) stated that another benefit 
from debt is the reverse of the negative aspect from bankruptcy cost. They argued that if 
managers would suffer personally when bankruptcy occurs, then they would work hard to avoid 
this - decreasing the agency problem. Hence, the trade-off theory argues that there is an optimal 
level of debt, which companies should strive for, and that should drive the capital structure 
decision.  
 
Miller (1977) acknowledges the deadweight costs of bankruptcy attached to debt financing but 
thinks that the great emphasis on the supposed trade-off between tax gains and bankruptcy costs 
is too large. He also questions why we have seen so little change in capital structure over time 
when the optimal capital structure is a matter of balancing tax advantages against bankruptcy 
costs. It does not seem to be a question of a lag of adjustment since the disequilibrium (non-
optimal) structure of firms has been around for thirty years without changing, Miller concludes 
in 19772.  
 
Another theory, named the pecking order theory was first presented by Gordon Donaldson in the 
60’s and expanded by Myers and Majluf (1984). According to this, most firms don´t have a well 
defined debt-to-value ratio. This theory evolves from the question of asymmetric information in 
regard of equity financing, and whether the current management is most concerned with present 
above future shareholder. 
 
This implies that firms don’t prefer to be in situations where they cannot finance their activities 
internally and that the least attractive situation to be in is when you need to issue equity to fund 
your project. Asymmetric information and its byproducts is an important aspect in the pecking 
order world (Myers, 1984). Myers (1984) discusses the obvious ambiguity that a pecking order 
goes against shareholders interest, because of the information gap between issuers and buyers3. 
The manager of a firm will be worried about the real intrinsic value of the firms existing shares, 
i.e. the “old” shareholders wealth, and wants the price in the rights issue to at least reflect the 
true intrinsic value of the equity.  
                                                
2 Miller. M. “Debt and Taxes”. (1977). The Journal of Finance. Vol. 32. No. 2. p. 246.  
3 Myers. S. “The Capital Structure Puzzle”. (1984).The Journal of Finance. Vol. 39. No. 3. p. 583. 
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But since this is obvious to the investors buying the “new” equity, they will assume that the firm 
manager doesn’t act in their interest regarding the matter of the “new” equity’s price. 
 
From this, Myers (1984) states a few decision rules. Reflecting the costs of external financing 
and the advantage in debt over equity the general rule is “issue safe securities before risky  
ones”4. The next ground rule is “issue debt when investors undervalue the firm, and equity, or 
some other risky security when they overvalue it”5. This reflects the discussion about whose 
information is best, the manager’s on the inside or the investor’s on the outside?  
 
Regarding the timing aspect of issuing securities Myers (1984) states that “firms apparently try 
to time stock issues when stock prices are high”6. Given that firms seek for external financing, 
they will be more likely to carry through the issuing of risky securities when the stock price has 
risen than when it has fallen. This fact is somewhat embarrassing for both the trade-off theory 
and the pecking order theory. The first one states that when firm value rises, the debt-to-value 
rises – which is not the case in the above scenario. The pecking order hypothesis states that 
manager’s superior information over the investor’s gives the advantage in a rights issue - but 
investors ability to interpret the subconscious message of a rights issue most probably mitigate 
this advantage. It’s both possible and plausible that the manager just got “bad” news, and want to 
profit from the current “good” situation in the firm before the bad news goes public. 
 
If we compare a profitable firm to an unprofitable firm in the same industry sector, the first one 
will probably end up with a really low level of debt with respect to firms in the same industry 
sector, while the second one will end up having a really high level of debt followed by increased 
costs of financial distress (Myers 1984). Both of them may put some effort in rebalancing their 
capital structures but in the same time they may not. The problem with asymmetric information 
mentioned above returns in this case. Since investors don’t know the intentions of a firm, there 
will always be an individual aspect of each single firm to be taken into consideration while 
analyzing the nature of capital structures. 
                                                
4 Myers. S. “The Capital Structure Puzzle”. (1984).The Journal of Finance. Vol. 39. No. 3. p. 584. 
5 Myers. S. “The Capital Structure Puzzle”. (1984).The Journal of Finance. Vol. 39. No. 3. p. 585. 
6 Myers. S. “The Capital Structure Puzzle”. (1984).The Journal of Finance. Vol. 39. No. 3. p. 586. 
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Myers (1984) looks at the situation above saying that “if this story is right, average debt ratios 
will vary from industry to industry, because asset risk, asset type, and requirements for external 
funds also vary by industry. But a long-run industry average will not be a meaningful target for 
individual firms in that industry”7. 
 
Focusing on further aspects of what drives debt level in firms Jensen and Meckling (1976) 
explain that due to agency cost, a firm will use a non-optimal debt level if managed by some 
other than the sole owner. The reasons for this are given by utility maximization and incentives. 
Since the upside of further debt often is small and a possible bankruptcy might cause the loss of 
employement agents, managers of firms, tend to avoid further risk.  
3. METHODOLOGY AND MODELS 
 
To investigate the time constant effect when looking at capital structure of firms we use a fixed 
effects model. The advantage of using a fixed effects model is that it allows for the time varying 
effects in our explanatory variables to be correlated with the time constant effect ai (Wooldridge 
2014). Another model, which is plausible when measuring effects over time, is the random 
effects model. This allows for the explanatory variables to be constant over time, which most 
probably is not the case with our data. 
 
Concept of fixed effects model: E(y!") = a! + β!E(x!")+. . .+β!E(x!")   + E(u!") 
 
Concept of random effects model: y!" = β! + β!x!"#+. . .+β!x!"# + v!", where v!" = a! + u!" 
 
To definitely decide between using the random or fixed effects model we test both the models for 
consistency with a random effects model. This means that the null-hypothesis is that the random 
effects model is consistent. In our case we got significant results in both tests of the models and 
therefore we reject the null-hypothesis and choose to use the fixed effects model8.  
 
                                                
7 Myers. S. “The Capital Structure Puzzle”. (1984).The Journal of Finance. Vol. 39. No. 3. p. 590. 
8 See Sargan-Hansen test in table 3 and Hausman test in table 4. 
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Also, in a fixed effect model the attrition, which is the dropout of observation for some 
unobserved reasons (for example a merger between two firms in our sample) (Wooldridge, 
2014), is allowed to correlate with the time-constant ai which in this case solves a potential 
problem with eventuell occuring bias in our model. 
 
To help us answering our questions we construct two regression models. These are:  
 
(1) Debt  to  Equity!" = α! + β!roa!" + β!tangibility!" + β!marketcap!" + β!std_return!"+ +β!cf_std_proc!" + u!" 
 
(2) Pb!" = α! +   β!roa!" + β!debtequity!" + β!std_return!" + β!cf_std_proc!" + +β!intcov!" + β!debtequity_square!" + u!" 
 
In (1), we construct a similar model to that Rajan and Zingales used in their paper “What do we 
really know about capital structures?” (2005). We use leverage as a dependent variable. As 
independent variables we use profitability and firm size. We also include the firm risk, derived 
from the preceding year’s volatility in the share price, and the cash flow risk, preceding year’s 
quarterly volatility in free cash flow. We have not noticed a test that includes the two latter 
variables, in any previous study that we have read. 
 
In (2) we test for the effect of leverage on market performance and equity value of the firms. 
Inspired by other papers regarding firm performance, among those the studies of the effect of 
ownership to performance by Villalonga and Amit (2006), where they choose to explain Tobin’s 
q we think that we get a result that we can decipher more stringently by choosing the price-to-
book ratio (denoted Pb above) as endogen variable. Since our focus lies in the interest of the 
shareholders of a firm we rather look at the market value of the equity than at the market value of 
the firm, as Tobin’s q suggests. 
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In (2) the independent variables are profitability, leverage, firm risk, cash flow risk, solvency and 
the square of the leverage. The latter is included to test for the nonlinear effect of debt on equity 
value. 
 
To be sure that we control the effect of outliers in the model we use the natural logarithm of both 
the dependent and independent variables. We do this since we see that the variables in their 
“initial” form (i.e. as shown in Table 1) have skewed distributions and we need to transform 
them to a more normally distributed form9. This makes the interpretation of our results a little 
more complicated, as the coefficients of the independent variables is the elasticity of the 
dependent variable with regards to the independent variable, i.e. the effect of a one percent 
change in the independent variable. (Wooldridge, 2014) 
 
To control for consistency in our models, we conduct regressions in three steps. The purpose of 
this is to see that we don’t miss peculiar effects of adding further independent variables during 
the evolving in to our final models. We start with the main independent variable, that from 
theory grasps the essence of our two questions stated in the introduction and then go on with 
including more variables that we expect will increase explanatory power, and finally regress the 
whole model including all the explanatories we have chosen. 
 
When modelling, we are put in situations where we need to be careful of a few things. These are: 
how to handle the two Gauss Markov Multiple Linear Regression assumptions regarding no 
heteroskedasticity and the zero conditional mean in the error term. Also, we need to handle the 
serial correlation, which our models contain. The tests for these issues are showed in the tables 3 
and 4. 
 
Regarding the first and the second we use cluster robust standard errors for our estimated 
coefficients. This will help us computing the “right” t-statistic (Wooldridge 2014) and p-value, 
which will increase our confidence in drawing conclusions from the estimates of our model. This 
leaves us with the handling of the last issue, the assumption of zero conditional mean in the error 
term. 
                                                
9 See Appendix 3 och 4. 
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The assumption of the zero conditional mean in the error term states that with respect to any of 
the explanatory variables in a econometric model the error term is consistent over all 
independent variables over all time periods, i.e. the variables exhibit strict exogeneity. This 
implies that the error and the explanatory variables must be uncorrelated. In our regression 
results we see that our models face correlation between the error term and our explanatory 
variables, although it is pretty small in both regressions. 
 
From this we conclude that the models to some extent violate the strict exogeneity assumption, 
meaning that the estimators are not the best linear unbiased estimators (Wooldridge, 2014). This 
means that among all linear unbiased estimators possible, the ones in our models to some extent 
don’t exhibit the smallest variance attainable (Wooldridge, 2014). The obvious subsequent risk is 
that we get estimators that don’t mirror the actual effects of the estimators in the underlying 
population. 
4. DATA 
 
Our sample contains of the firms in the Standard and Poor 500 index as of year 201410. The 
observations are collected on January 15th each year between 2005 and 2014, besides the cash 
flow risk and firm risk which is observed every year preciding the observation date. 
 
Since some data in our sample drops out because it was not reported in certain years we have 
studied, we have an unbalanced panel data set of 468 firms in the leverage model and 404 firms 
in the models for the shareholder value model. Also, since we are using the natural logarithm of 
the price-to-book and debt-to-equity as dependent variable, some firms with no leverage will also 
drop out from the sample. Table 1 and 2 shows explanations and summary statistics of the 
variables included in our models11. 
 
  
                                                
10 CNN Money. (2014). “S&P500 Index”. Cable News Network. Time Warner.  
http://money.cnn.com/data/markets/sandp/?page=1  
11 For further calculations of variables, see Appendix 6. 
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Table 1 – Description of variables 
This table explains the notations of the variable in the regression models in this paper, which 
entities they are measured in, what they are called in everyday use, a short description of the 
variables and what the different variables measures. 
Variable Entity Name Description Measures 
pb ratio Price-to-
Book ratio 
The market price for the 
equity divided by the book 
value of the equity 
Shareholder 
value 
debtequity ratio Debt-to-
Equity ratio 
Total Debt divided by 
shareholder’s equity 
Leverage 
roa % Return on 
assets 
Net Income divided by 
total assets 
Profitability 
marketcap Mill. $ Market 
capitalization 
Total value of outstanding 
equity 
Firm size 
std_return % Stand 
deviation in 
returns 
Standard deviation in 
returns the year foregoing 
the observation date 
Firm risk 
intcov % Interest 
coverage 
Earnings before interest 
and taxes divided by 
interest costs 
Solvency 
tangibility % Tangible 
assets to 
assets 
Tangible assets divided by 
total assets 
Tangibility 
cf_std_proc % Standard 
deviation in 
free cash 
flow 
Standard deviation of 
percentage deviations from 
the quarterly average free 
cash flow in a firm 
Cash flow risk 
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Table 2 - Summary Statistics  
This table of summary statistics displays the number of observations made, the mean, standard 
deviation, minimum, and maximum values of the different variables used in this paper. The 
data set includes 502 firms in the period 2005-2014. 
Variables Obs. Mean Std. Dev.  Min Max 
pb 4,476 4.483 20.58 0.099 773.9 
debtequity 4,697 131.3 766.8 0 35,033 
roa 4,694 6.944 7.565 -58.14 61.07 
marketcap 4,649 25,731 44,866 181.3 497,483 
std_return 4,066 34.76 19.47 11.56 198.6 
intcov 3,573 65.78 716.0 -502.9 30,851 
tangibility 4,530 78.95 20.35 9.291 100 
cf_std_proc 4,765 370.1 3,980 1.097 237,458 
 
5. RESULTS 
 
Leverage model (1) 
 
Since the pecking order theory predicts that more profitable firms use less debt, (Myers, 1984), 
and the trade-off theory suggests the opposite (Fama and French, 2002), the result of testing for 
the effects of return on assets in our model is a crucial test of the two theories plausibility. We 
are interested in what effect return on assets has on the leverage ratio to draw a conclusion in 
favour of one of the two theories. Fama’s and French’s study found support for the pecking order 
theory.  
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Regarding other independent variables we expect a positive relationship to debt for tangible 
assets. From theory we see that tangible assets make good collateral and therefore should reduce 
the cost of debt (Rajan and Zingales, 1995). Firm size decrease the risk of default (Rajan and 
Zingales, 1995) and correlate with age and cost of seeking external capital (Fama and French, 
2002), which implies that it would still have a positive correlation with debt. With larger firms 
being more investigated in detail by analysists, it seems plausible that increased firm size reduces 
the asymmetric information problem discussed in the pecking order theory.  
 
Fama and French (2002) conclude that smaller firms have more assymetric information and 
should therefore use more debt than equity, which would lead to more leverage for smaller firms. 
If firm size has a negative relationship with debt, it would support the pecking order theory. If 
the reverse result is reached, and since size has an inverse correlation with default, it would 
support the trade-off theory. Therefore this is the other important test for the two theories. 
  
Large firms have more sources of cash flow and hence less volatile cash flow. Less volatile cash 
flow should lead to higher leverage predicted by both theories. We expect to have a negative 
relationship between cash flow risk and leverage. Even though several authors, including Fama 
and French, talk about cash flow variance and use firm size as proxy for this, we have not found 
a another study that explicitly include a variable for this in the same way we do. As firm size also 
correlates with age and cost of external financing we include this variable. Doing this separates 
the effect of cash flows from firm size and shed light on the assymetric information aspect of the 
latter. 
 
For the measurement of another risk-aspect, the firm risk, we expect it to have a negative 
relationship to debt, since it increases the risk of financial distress, as predicted by the trade off 
theory.  
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Table 3 – The factors that affects leverage 
This table reports the results from a stepwise fixed effetcs regression model on leverage. Model 
1.1 uses one independent varible, 1.2 uses three independent variables and the final model 1.3 
uses five independent variables. All coefficients are rounded to three decimals. 
ln(leverage) Model 1.1 Model 1.2 Model 1.3 
ln(profitability) -0.185*** -0.162*** -0.134*** 
  (0.029) (0.028) (0.027) 
ln(firm size)   -0.140** -0.192*** 
    (0.061) (0.061) 
ln(firm risk)   -0.096** -0.109*** 
    (0.039) (0.041) 
ln(tangibility)     -0.637*** 
      (0.212) 
ln(cash flow risk)     -0.000 
      (0.014) 
Constant 4.204*** 5.844*** 9.088*** 
  (0.048) (0.622) (1.270) 
        
Observations 4,078 3,507 3,329 
R2 0.019 0.025 0.034 
Number of firms 487 479 468 
Sargan-Hansen statistic (deciding 
between random and fixed effect 
regression) 
H0: difference in 
coefficients is not 
systematic 
S-H statistic: 
98.994 
Chi-sq(5)  
P-value = 0.000 
Wald test for heteroskedasticity H0: sigma(i)2 = chi2 (468) = 
2.1E+32 
Prob > chi2 = 
16 
 
 
sigma2 for all i 0.0000 
Wooldridge test for 
autocorrelation 
H0: no first-order 
autocorrelation 
F(1, 402) = 10.992 
 
Prob > F = 
0.0010 
1)  Robust standard errors in parentheses 
2) *** indicates a p-value < 0.01, ** indicates a p-value < 0.05, * indicates a p-value < 0.1 
 
The results from the regression model on leverage are shown in table 3. With a negative sign on 
the coefficient for profitability, our result gives support to the pecking order theory. This is in 
line with that Fama and French (2002) obtained in their paper, and our result aswell confirms the 
pecking order theory’s stating that internal cash flows are preferred when it comes to financial 
decisions. This result is at conflict with the trade-off theory. 
 
Firm size shows support of the pecking order theory since its sign is negative. Pecking order 
theory predicts that smaller firms use less debt, since the problem of asymmetric information 
should be larger. Firm size also correlates with age and the cost of seeking outside capital (Fama 
and French, 2002). The risk of the firm has a negative relationship with debt, also as expected. 
This is in line with the trade-off theory that predicts that when risk of default increases debt 
decreases. Regarding the other risk measurement variable, the cash flow risk, we don’t see a 
remarkable effect departing from what we expected since it’s negative but we don’t have any 
significance so we won’t discuss this further. 
 
An unexpected result is the inverse relationship for tangibility to debt. We believe that this might 
be caused by a skewed distribution of the residuals, even after logarithmic transformation of the 
data for tangibility12. Other than the fact that this result goes against logic and theory, such a 
skewed distribution of the variable tangibility makes it plausible to say that this result is 
untrustworthy and that outliers in our sample to a large extent drive the distribution of the 
variable. Even though it´s significant we won´t go in to this further due to the problem just 
discussed. 
 
                                                
12 See Appendix 5. 
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Looking at the economic effects of the significant variables in the model we see that a one 
percent increase in profitability has a 0.134 percent decrease in debt-to-equity ratio, which is 
rather small since a one percent change in profitability is quite an achievement. The economic 
effect of a one percent change in firm size is -0.192. Which is slightly bigger than the proxy for 
firm risk with an economic effect of -0.109. Tangibility and cash flow risk is either not 
trustworthy due to not non-normal distribution or not being statistically significant.  
 
By adding more variables in model 1.3 we increase the R2, regardless it is still low but we don’t 
over-interpret it’s magnitude since it, in a fixed effects model, mostly tells us how much of the 
time-varying effect that is explained by the independent variables (Wooldridge 2014). The 
economic effect from the regressors decreases as other variables are being added, but contributes 
with explanatory power - looking both at significance and the somewhat increase in R2. When 
predicting the regression residuals we see that these exhibit little skewness, implying that the 
model follows a nearly normal distribution13. We see that the model is stable with respect to 
coefficient signs since these are constant during the stepwise regression ending up in the final 
model 1.3. 
 
Shareholder value model (2) 
 
We expect leverage to have a positive but diminishing effect on shareholder value, as predicted 
by the trade-off theory. A firm that chooses to expose themselves to either too little or too much 
leverage is expected to have a lower equity valuation. This implies that we should see a positive 
sign on the coefficent for leverage and a negative sign on the coefficient for the squared 
leverage. 
 
As for other variables, we expect profitability to have a positive effect on shareholder value since 
higher returns on asset has a higher economic value than a lower returning asset. We expect a 
negative coefficent for the cash flow variable. Higher variance of cash flow would mean higher 
risk since earnings are more erratic. The same goes for the risk in stock return of firms, which 
also is expected to have a negative effect on shareholder value.  
                                                
13 See Appendix 3. 
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Table 4 – The factors that affect shareholder value 
This table reports the results from a stepwise fixed effetcs regression model on shareholder 
value. Model  2.1 uses one independent varible, 2.2 uses three independent variables and the 
final model 2.3 uses six independent variables. All coefficients are rounded to three decimals. 
ln(shareholder value) Model 2.1 Model 2.2 Model 2.3 
ln(leverage) 0.102*** 0.127*** 0.113*** 
  (0.025) (0.028) (0.038) 
ln(profitability)   0.162*** 0.105*** 
    (0.017) (0.022) 
ln(firm risk)   -0.310*** -0.297*** 
    (0.019) (0.024) 
ln(solvency)     0.177*** 
      (0.023) 
ln(leverage)2     0.0311*** 
      (0.007) 
ln(cash flow risk)     -0.002 
      (0.008) 
Constant 0.574*** 1.270*** 0.491** 
  (0.098) (0.139) (0.190) 
        
Observations 4,239 3,485 2,616 
R2 0.030 0.198 0.322 
Number of firms 486 477 404 
Hausman test (deciding 
between random and fixed 
effect regression) 
H0: difference in 
coefficients is not 
chi2(6) = 138.02 Prob>chi2 = 
0.0000 
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systematic 
Wald test for 
heteroskedasticity 
H0: sigma(i)2 = 
sigma2 for all i 
chi2 (404)  =   
2.7E+32 
Prob>chi2 = 
0.0000 
Wooldridge test for 
autocorrelation 
H0: no first-order 
autocorrelation 
F(1, 301) = 69.213 Prob > F = 
0.0000 
1)  Robust standard errors in parentheses 
2) *** indicates a p-value < 0.01, ** indicates a p-value < 0.05, * indicates a p-value < 0.1 
 
In table 4 we see that the effect of leverage on shareholder value is positive, the interpretation of 
this is that as one increase debt, one increase shareholder value. As the trade-off theory predicts, 
when a company applies too much debt the value of the firm goes down. When testing for 
nonlinear relationship of debt we also get a positive sign, which is remarkable and implies that 
the positive effect of debt is growing. This goes against the diminishing effect of leverage 
predicted by the trade-off theory. In the trade off theory from Kraus and Litzenberger (1973) 
they use the variable firm value (the total value of the debt and equity of the firm) where we are 
using the value of the equity. As the downside is limited for the equity and the upside is 
infinitive, one could argue that increased risk for the firm could have positive effects from a 
shareholder’s perspective. We are however hesitant to believe that the firm should be awashed in 
debt. We believe that this would lead to higher cost of debt and that there is such a thing as too 
much debt. 
 
Further looking into table 4 we see that profitability has a positive effect on shareholder value. 
Another expected result is the inverse relationship between shareholder value and firm risk. As 
firm risk increases, measured by the standard deviation of the stock return, the value of the 
equity goes down. Solvency is positively related with shareholder value, showing the obvious 
benefit of ability to cover interest costs also implies that the market values firms that exhibit 
positive earnings. Cash flow risk has a negative sign, congruent with our expectations but the 
result is not significant.  
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Regarding model stability we see that the coefficients differ slightly in magnitude but keep their 
signs during the stepwise regression process. Leverage and firm risk seem to be quite consistent 
through the exercise, while the effect of profitability decreases when we add more independent 
variables. The R2 measure makes a leap from 3% to about 20% going from model 2.1 to model 
2.2 and ends up in model 2.3 on a level of about 32%. This tells us that including further 
explanatories has helped us explain shareholder value and the variables seem to provide strong 
explanatory power as they are included during the steps. The regression residuals are nearly 
normally distributed14 which tells of a low presence of skewness in the model that is preferred 
when aiming at making conclusions from our result. 
 
For purposes of economic effect of the variables, firm risk has the largest impact on shareholder 
value where a one percent change decrease shareholder value by 0.297 percent. Solvency has the 
second largest impact with a positive effect of 0.177 percent. An increase in leverage ratio by 
one percent would have a 0.113 percent effect on shareholder value. One percent increase in 
profitability would have a 0.105 percent increase on shareholder value. From this follows that a 
change in the firm risk, i.e. more present volatility in the stock return of the firm, is more 
negative for shareholder value than what the three latter is positive when looking at the 
individual effect. 
6. CONCLUSION 
 
From our results in section 5 we find that 1) The factors that affect a firm’s capital structure are 
profitability, firm size and firm risk 2) A firm’s leverage has a positive effect on shareholder 
value.  
 
We make the conclusion that our results support the pecking order model regarding decision 
making about the firm’s capital structure. The more profitable a firm is, the less debt it uses. 
Since Fama and French (2002) obtained the same effect for profitability with respect to 
shareholder value we are not surprised by this. The effect from firm size on leverage, the other 
big test of the conflicting theories, is also consistent with pecking order theory. Looking at the 
                                                
14 See appendix 4. 
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effect on shareholder’s value from the decision of leverage, we can see that market have valued 
equity higher when debt in firms has increased, which verifies that leverage has a positive effect 
on shareholder value. 
 
When looking at the effect of firm size on leverage, we see that Rajan and Zingales (1995) had 
an opposite result in most of their regressions than ours. In one of the eight countries they looked 
at they got the same result as we did. In respect to the papers of Fama and French (2002) and 
Rajan and Zingales (1995) our result gives more weight to the pecking-order theory force of 
what determines capital structure decision. We find some support for the trade-off theory, for 
example seeing that further risk decreases the leverage ratio so we don’t discard of the effects of 
this theory as a whole.  
 
One question to consider is what happens to a succesful firm that generates profit. From our 
result we see that the effect is that leverage is lower and the shareholder value is higher. The 
lower leverage makes it plausible to think that firms finance themselves internally, which also is 
supported by pecking order theory. Still, further leverage also would benefit the shareholder 
value, implying that firms should take on more debt.  
 
This brings to front an issue for the firm with the agency costs of free cash flow, as discussed by 
Jensen and Meckling (1976), and debt. Due to risk aversion, management in firms sometimes 
chooses to prioritize their own utility maximation over the best of the firm. This implies that 
shareholder value is lost in subjective decision-making. Bankruptcy, which risk is driven by 
further leverage, would be a more severe occurrence for the employees than for the owners, 
because the investors can diversify in multiple enterprises. However, testing for this is hard. 
 
To sum up our effort, we achieve our goal to answer the two main questions of concern. We also 
make way for further discussion and investigation of the agency costs of free cash flow and 
corporate governance, a complex matter that seems to be far from solved. While testing we find, 
with exception of firm risk’s effect on leverage, that most of our results speak for the forces of 
the pecking order model.  
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7. APPENDIX 
 
APPENDIX 1 
This table reports the correlation between the variables used in the models. 
 
pxtobook debtequity roa marketcap std_return cf_std_proc intcov tangibility 
pxtobook 1.000 
       debtequity 0.630 1.000 
      roa 0.109 -0.049 1.000 
     marketcap 0.013 -0.001 0.121 1.000 
    std_return -0.037 0.004 -0.173 -0.163 1.000 
   cf_std_proc -0.005 0.003 -0.048 -0.019 0.024 1.000 
  intcov 0.010 -0.013 0.093 0.036 0.011 -0.006 1.000 
 tangibility -0.011 -0.005 0.005 0.024 0.135 0.046 0.041 1.000 
 
APPENDIX 2 
This table reports the correlation between the logarithms of variables used in the models. 
 ln(de) ln(pb) ln(roa) ln(mc) ln(prisk) ln(cfstd) ln(ic) ln(tang) 
ln(de) 1.000        
ln(pb) -0.003 1.000       
ln(roa) -0.364 0.537 1.000      
ln(mc) -0.022 0.102 0.058 1.000     
ln(prisk) -0.079 -0.190 -0.071 -0.305 1.000    
ln(cfstd) 0.146 -0.154 -0.215 -0.179 0.058 1.000   
ln(ic) -0.687 0.338 0.584 0.214 -0.002 -0.274 1.000  
ln(tang) -0.007 -0.007 -0.084 0.005 0.107 0.196 0.027 1.000 
 
23 
 
 
APPENDIX 3 
Figure showing the density distribution of predicted residuals in model (1). 
 
 
APPENDIX 4 
Figure showing the density distribution of predicted residuals in model (2).
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APPENDIX 5 
Figure showing the density distribution of ln(tangibility). 
 
 
APPENDIX 6 
 
Our data is collected from Bloomberg Terminal. The observations for appendix 6.1-6.7 are 
collected on January 15th during the period 2005-2014. Firm risk is the daily standard deviation 
for the stock price for the companies during the previous year for the period 2005-2014, see 
appendix 6.6. Cash flow data is only available on a quarterly basis, we have calculated the 
standard deviation for the cash flow versus the average cash flow for that year over the years 
2004-2013, see appendix 6.7.  
 6.1  Shareholder  value =   Market  Capitalisation  Equity  Book  Value  Equity  
 6.2  Leverage = Total  DebtEquity  
 6.3  Profitability = Net  IncomeTotal  Assets 
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 6.4  Tangibility =   Tangible  AssetsTotal  Assets  
 
 
6.5 Solvency = !"#$!"#$%$&#  !"#$%&$ 
 6.6  Firm  risk = trailing  365  days  standard  deviation, stock  return 
 
6.7  Cash  flow  risk =    1N Σ((CF!"CF! − 1)− (ΣCF!"CF!n ))! 
Risk in cash flow computed from the quarterly deviations from the quarterly average during one 
year in the period 2004-2013. 
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